and Kantís Civil Society
by Chris W. Surprenant
Morality, as Immanuel
Kant understands it, depends on the capacity of a person to be the agent
and owner of his own actions, not merely a conduit for social and psychological
forces and influences over which he has little or no control. As a result,
Kantís moral philosophy focuses primarily on the topic of individual freedom
and the necessary preconditions of the possibility of that freedom. In
the Groundwork and second Critique, Kantís discussion
of the connection between morality and freedom centers on autonomy of
the will. He identifies autonomy as the supreme principle of morality
and defines it as ďchoos[ing] only in such a way that the maxims of your
choice are also included as universal law in the same volitionĒ (Gr 4:440).
In this paper, I argue that, according to Kant, the possibility of autonomous
action requires that certain preconditions be met. Satisfying these preconditions
requires an individual to be a member of civil society (status civilis),
specifically, a civil society maintained by a strong, sovereign power.
This connection between freedom and civil society exists on two levels.
First, one precondition of autonomy (that is, internal freedom) is liberty
(that is, external freedom), and an individual can secure his liberty
only once he is a member of civil society. Second, an individual is free
only when others recognize him as a being with the capacity for autonomous
action, and joining civil society is the process by which this recognition